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OXC 0307-67

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy for Operations, OSA

REFERENCE:

Memo from D/O/OSA dated 21 Feb 67; Subj: Aircraft Accident Report, A-12 #125 (OXC 0381-67)

Findings and Recommendations of the Accident Board

**UODT 2586** 

Commander's

Comments

SUBJECT:

Aircraft Accident Report, A-12 #125

The following are comments regarding items indicated in Reference A for OXCART action:

### Findings:

(1) Ref Para la: Concur, as concerns primary cause; however, additional comment should be made concerning other "pilot factors" which may be involved in the Contributing Cause. It would appear that a certain amount of over confidence and/or mission urgency may be involved since the pilot a) elected to fly the mission "as briefed" in spite of an inoperative autopilot; b) continued the mission "as briefed" with less than "full tanks" after the second air refueling and with some indication that a fuel or fuel gaging problem existed during refueling (which was apparently indicated when the fuel quantity went below "Bingo" fuel during second air refueling). c) The above factors seem to indicate that an additional Contributing Cause or Additional Finding might be recommended to the effect that "the pilot failed to recognize an apparent fuel or fuel gaging problem during the second refueling and elected to continue the mission "as briefed" when valid indications of such a malfunction existed. "

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## b. Additional Findings:

- (1) Ref Para lb(b): Concur.
- (2) Ref Para lb(d): Concur.

## c. Recommendations:

(1) Ref Para lc(i): Concur. However, this procedure should insure that the point is clearly identified and briefed as applicable to the programmed speed the procedure must also take into account forecast wind condition and time/fuel required in turn if returning to alternate.

- (2) Ref Item J(1): Concur. It must be clearly established, however, that the additional 10000# requirement is over and above the total combined requirement of chase and A-12 receiver.
  - (3) Ref Item J(2)(a): Concur.
- (4) Ref Item J(2)(b): Do not concur. Procedure does not take into account the possibility of the A-12 receiver arriving late, which could conceivably place the chase aircraft in position of having too little fuel to complete his mission without additional offload. Procedure should be amplified to include action to be taken in this event.

# d. Additional Actions:

- (1) Ref Item 2a: Concur. Recommend this include all A-12 pilots on a 30-60 day continuing basis.
- (2) Ref Item 2b: Concur. Request results/actions of Survival Review Board be forwarded to Project Headquarters.

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(3) Ref Item 2c: Concur. This IAW procedures specified in 3100. Recommend that aircraft which indicate a fuel gaging problem after completing validation series be required to be revalidated unless both (a) and (b) below complied with:

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- (a) Aircraft have completed a minimum of three successful flights after validation during which no fuel indicating system malfunctions occurred.
- (b) The source of the malfunction can be specifically determined and corrected prior to the next flight.

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- (4) Ref Item 2d: Concur. Additionally recommend that pilot be required to report "fuel on board" to tanker crew for relay to up as a supervisory aid.
  - (5) Ref Item 2e: Concur.
- e. Overall Comments (Accident Report):
- (1) Ref Tab H (Life Sciences Report): Possible fatigue factor indicated by Flight Surgeon. No reason given in Item 10 of the form; a comment should be made to give basis for this determination.

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- (2) Ref Tab N (Aircraft Accident Report): (Statement by Comment by during refueling which indicated he was not familiar with climbing air refueling would indicate more emphasis is required on special tactics during crew briefings.
- (3) Ref Item 11, AF Form 711 (Aircraft Accident Report): Last minute crew changes, which occurred in this case, have an adverse effect on crew discipline and morale. These should

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be held to a minimum, and considered only when operational requirements are such that no other course of action available. In these cases, supervisory personnel should assure that briefings adequately prepare pilot for the flight and that adequate time is made available for flight preparation.

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Chief, OXCART Division, Operations, OSA

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